

## SPECIAL ESTIMATE

## PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO THE INCLUSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN WESTERN DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

W A R N I N G

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PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO THE INCLUSION  
OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN WESTERN DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

Number 7

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The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 14 June.

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THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet reactions to: (a) the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO; (b) the formation of a Mediterranean Defense Pact including Greece and Turkey, with the US as a member; and (c) security arrangements between Greece and Turkey and certain individual NAT nations, including the US.

ESTIMATE

1. We estimate that the Kremlin is unlikely to precipitate a general war because of the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in any of the security agreements listed in the statement of this problem.
2. The Kremlin will almost certainly react to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in any Western security agreement with intensified psychological warfare, various modes of political and economic pressure upon countries outside the Soviet orbit (particularly upon the Near Eastern countries), diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, increased anti-Western propaganda, and threatening gestures.
3. We believe that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in a security pact which included the US would have little effect on the willingness of the Kremlin to accept greater risks of general war by local actions anywhere in the world in support of its policy objectives.
4. We believe that the Kremlin would regard the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in any defense agreement which also included the US, and particularly their inclusion in NATO:
  - a. As an obstacle to Soviet expansion not only in the Near East but also in Europe;

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- b. As an addition, though a minor one, to the military potential of NATO and West Germany;
- c. As a potential threat, though a limited and local one, to the security of the USSR;
- d. Probably also as further evidence of Western aggressive intent.

It is probable that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO or in a Mediterranean pact which included the US, Britain and France, would be regarded by the Kremlin as a more formidable obstacle to Soviet expansion and as a greater potential menace to the USSR than an agreement which did not include these Western European powers.

5. We believe, furthermore, that since the US has publicly proposed that Greece and Turkey be admitted to NATO, a refusal by Britain or France to undertake firm security commitments to those countries would be interpreted by the Kremlin as revealing weakness and dissension among the members of the Western alliance. Such a development would to some extent make subsequent security commitments by the US to Greece and Turkey appear to the Kremlin less formidable.

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